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History

Feller

TALLEYRAND AT THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

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Laura J. Feller
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TALLEYRAND AT THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

Prince Talleyrand is famed as an opportunist, a man able to serve and to survive many different régimes. In his role as the plenipotentiary of Louis XVIII at the Congress of Vienna, he maintained that he was one of the few ambassadors who was disinterestedly seeking a just and stable settlement for Europe, one based on principles and not power politics alone. Guglielmo Ferrero went so far as to call him "the loudspeaker for the secret conscience of the Congress." because of the stand he alone took in favor of "legitimacy" as the basis of the governments that had to be re-established after the Napoleonic wars.¹ Even some who have given him less credit for lofty motives, like J. G. Lockhart, have admitted that Talleyrand "had the European mind, which rejects grandiose schemes of conquest and regards war as a confession of diplomatic failure."² Many will concede that he desired peace for Europe, but the means he used to this end may sound cynical to twentieth-century ears.

Whether or not Talleyrand was devoted to such abstract principles as legitimacy, he "manoeuvred his country back from outlawry into international fellowship."³ When the Congress began, France was faced with a coalition of her former enemies. Representatives of Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria planned^{to} settle many of the questions that would come before the Congress without any interference. By the end of the Congress, France was in the counsels of the greatest powers and had been an active participant in the negotiations at Vienna; she had even been in a secret alliance with Great Britain and Austria whose purpose was to restrain Russian and Prussian ambitions.

Just as opinions vary on how much the French achievement of a certain

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parity with the greatest powers in Europe was due to Talleyrand's own efforts and how much was due to circumstances beyond his control, it is not possible to say whether the interests of Louis and his own career loomed larger in Talleyrand's mind than a stable peace for Europe. There is also a duality in the diplomatic methods Talleyrand used at Vienna. Appeals to reason and moral idealism, threats, flattery, and appeals to the selfish interests of the other countries were all part of his approach, which he varied according to circumstances, time and audience. It was a remarkable performance by a man whom many contemporaries regarded as "the foremost diplomatist of his time."⁴ Of course, Talleyrand did not succeed in arranging everything to his liking, and the principles of legitimacy and balance of power which he praised were not consistently followed at the Congress.

*definitely
in touch with
Talleyrand
career*

The negotiations preliminary to the Congress were important in determining what Talleyrand's position at Vienna would be. Formerly a minister of Napoleon, he had become the head of a provisional government when the Allies took Paris in March, 1814, and was an important influence in getting the Bourbons restored; he told Alexander that their restoration was the "only hope of repose for France."⁵ When Louis XVIII made him the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he was responsible for settling a peace with the Allied powers. Talleyrand later remembered the Peace of Paris, signed on May 30, 1814, with pride. Considering the difficult circumstances, he thought it was a rather favourable peace for France.⁶ This treaty was the basis for the Congress, providing that after 2 months had passed the powers would send plenipotentiaries to Vienna to set up the arrangements for carrying

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out the Peace. In Talleyrand's opinion the most troublesome part of the treaty turned out to be the secret articles which declared that the allies would decide between themselves what would happen to the territories that France no longer claimed.⁷

Though several other questions remained to be settled, the French plenipotentiary would arrive at Vienna with the fate of France already settled. Talleyrand realized this and he also knew that the French representative would have to separate restoration France from revolutionary France in the minds of those at Vienna and assure them of the "solidité" of the Restoration, to keep France from being excluded from the "transactions de l' Europe."⁸ When Talleyrand was chosen to go to the Congress, Louis asked him to write his own instructions to be approved. He was also able to choose his assistants, and Talleyrand picked three men to accompany him who could not only keep him abreast of Parisian intrigues but could "report to his enemies (in Paris) what Talleyrand wished them to learn;" his niece would make the French embassy "agréable" in Viennese society.⁹

Talleyrand wrote his own instructions as if Louis were addressing them to his ambassadors before they went to Vienna. In them, he outlined the problems the Congress would face, and the role he thought France should play in it; he hoped her dignity would be established, to "give weight to the observations that I will be called to make in the interests of justice."¹⁰ In the first question to be decided, that of who should be represented at the Congress, "La raison se joint à l'intérêt de France," for the possibility existed that all those^{countries} who were in the war would attend. Talleyrand hoped for wide participation; the more the smaller states claimed,

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the less would be left for aggrandizement of the larger countries. Besides, France would be able to get influence over the smaller nations by protecting their interests.¹¹ In regard to this problem, Talleyrand set forth the argument that conquest does not give sovereignty to a conqueror unless the sovereign of a defeated country cedes it. Talleyrand used this idea as a basis for demanding that Joachim Murat, set on the throne of Naples by Napoleon,¹² be rejected because he held his rights through conquest.

As for the subjects handled at Vienna, justice required that certain types of questions should only be negotiated with the consent of the party involved.¹³ "La France est dans l'heureuse situation de n'avoir point à désirer que la justice et l'utilité soient divisées".¹⁴ Since, according to Talleyrand, the equilibrium of the systems in Europe could only be partial and fragile, it could only last as long as some large states were moderate and just; for example, Austria should be kept from dominating Italy and small countries should be conserved as a check on larger ones. Though opposed to Russian acquisition of Poland, Talleyrand argued that an independent Poland would be in anarchy, so restoration of the conditions of the last partition would be the best that could be done.¹⁵ Concessions were not precluded by the instructions; but, the four most important points were listed in order of their relative importance: 1-that Austrian princes should not succeed to the states of the king of Sardinia, 2-that Naples be restored to Ferdinand IV, 3-that not all of Poland should go to Russia, and 4-that Prussia should not get Saxony, at least not all of it, or Mayence. Talleyrand suggested that the ambassadors should reassure the other countries with their moderation and not abandon previously made obligations of France.¹⁶

C. K. Webster has written that Talleyrand, as he wrote his instructions, "hoped to effect France's entrance into the European directorate by insisting on the rights of the smaller powers. But Talleyrand was also seeking other means by which he might make his presence felt at the approaching reunion, while none of the Great Powers was unconscious of the fact that France was a possible ally."¹⁷ Talleyrand tried to get more friendly relations between Louis and Alexander I after the czar made a visit to London which worsened Anglo-Russian relations.¹⁸ However, it was to England that Talleyrand looked with the most hope. In August, Castlereagh visited Paris and talked with both Talleyrand and Louis; an understanding was reached between them. Talleyrand "endeavoured to bring forward points in which he believed Castlereagh's views would coincide with his own," suggesting that England and France should act together as the only two disinterested powers at the Congress. Castlereagh was reluctant to break the Quadruple Alliance, but Talleyrand and Louis offered him French support opposing Russia in the Polish settlement.¹⁹

*is this me
understanding?
standing?*

Another weapon that Talleyrand had stored up for the fight against the allied exclusion of France from their counsels, was his idea of legitimacy, which he wanted to make the basis for re-establishing governments disrupted by Napoleon. Legitimacy, in his eyes, resulted from a long period of possession of power. This concept was for him, "the remedy for all evils" and "a necessary element in the repose and happiness of peoples."²⁰ Talleyrand was not in favor of absolutist governments, but of stable ones, and he thought that in an age when the belief that governments exist only for the people was growing, a legitimate government should remove fear of the abuse of power and promote prosperity.²¹

answer

When he arrived at Vienna, Talleyrand found that, as he had suspected, the 4 allied powers intended to keep the direction and initiative of affairs in their own hands. Frederick von Gentz, secretary of the Congress for Austria, wrote in his memoirs that "...the real purpose of the Congress was to divide amongst the conquerors the spoils taken from the vanquished," but

"Everything relating to France having been regulated by the Treaty of Paris, they (the French ministers) had nothing to demand for themselves, and could confine themselves to watching the conduct of others."²²

Of course Talleyrand was interested in doing more than watching, but there were several obstacles to his plans; one was the personal distrust of Talleyrand which many of the other ministers had.²³ Another was the popular reaction against the lenient terms of the treaty of Paris in many of the war-torn countries. The allies did not want to let France into their counsels, so by the time Talleyrand arrived at Vienna, they had already made some arrangements and plans for the Congress among themselves. One of the Prussian representatives, William von Humboldt wrote that

"...a Congress has been called together here through an indiscretion in the Treaty of Paris...With the Congress as an excuse, France pursues another object - that of getting its hands on affairs which evidently must be settled by the decision of the other powers."²⁴

France was to be isolated, therefore.

What gave Talleyrand an entering wedge to break into the deliberations, was the debate over what procedure the Congress should use. Castlereagh and Humboldt had both submitted preliminary plans for running the Congress which suggested that the direction of the Congress should be in the hands of the Great Powers. France and Spain were included in this group, but both Castlereagh and Humboldt wished to reduce their role to formally consenting

to the arrangements that the four Allied powers, who would have the initiative, wished to make. Castlereagh's plan stated that France and Spain could work on friendly terms with the four allies if they did not try

"to disturb the course of policy on which the Allies were agreed, and which they still consider themselves as confederated to carry into execution."²⁵

Talleyrand, in order to break into this inner council, appealed to the ambitions of the great mass of plenipotentiaries. In his memoirs he describes his conduct: "Je ne me plains point...je me bornai à faire connaître tout le mécontentement que j'éprouvais aux ministres des puissances secondaires..." Once he had assured himself of their support, Talleyrand began to press for the opening of the Congress.²⁶

Finally, Talleyrand was invited to a conference on September 30, 1814 due to "l'influence personnelle que j'avais heureusement acquise dans les négociations précédentes sur les principaux personnages du congrès," and, perhaps, the leverage of the support of the lesser powers.²⁷ The Spanish ambassador, Labrador, received the same invitation, and the two of them joined in order to force Great Britain, Prussia, Austria and Russia to let them participate in decision-making. Talleyrand, from the beginning of the meeting, took the offensive; first he insisted that each state should have two representatives at the preliminary conferences - a small point, but Talleyrand won it, and small victories can be important in diplomacy. He was given a copy of a protocol already signed by the four Allied powers; immediately he protested against the use of the word "allies" in it, insisting that since the peace treaty had been signed there could no longer be an alliance against France. Talleyrand could see the danger that this protocol, which said that

the six major powers should arrange the working committees of the Congress, would result in practical domination by the four allies.²⁸ France, he assured the allies, was not only a conservative power concerned with her reputation alone and asking for nothing, but "La présence d'un ministre de Louis XVIII consacre ici le principe sur lequel repose tout l'ordre social." Excluding France from the deliberations would be a denial of the idea of legitimacy and the principle that sovereignty can't be acquired by conquest; "mais cette idée est bien loin de moi car nous sentons tous également qu'une marche simple et droite est seule digne de la noble mission que nous avons à remplir."²⁹

From this appeal to moral duty, Talleyrand pushed for a fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty of Paris. Along with Labrador, he demanded a firm date for the first meeting of all the representatives in a plenary session of the Congress, saying that he could not recognize any powers trying to dictate the questions that were for the whole Congress to decide. The others were embarrassed, and tried both to deny and explain the arrangements they had made before the Congress. Talleyrand then tried to make "... quelques concessions aux amours-propres que je voyais en souffrance." He managed the pride of the ministers by admitting that in a large conference, affairs would have to be arranged by groups smaller than the entire congress. The protocols previously made between the four allied powers were put aside, and Talleyrand asked for time to consider their proposals.³⁰

Talleyrand wrote that after this first meeting, France was part of all the important conferences of the great powers.³¹ He finally had to consent to postponement of the plenary session of the Congress, even though he had the support of the smaller German powers. He made his concession conditional on the setting of a definite date, and acceptance of a "règle"

what proposals?

for admitting the plenipotentiaries of the Congress that would have excluded Murat. Accordingly, some feel that all Talleyrand got from the meeting was that a council of the four or the six was not recognized; the allies continued to exclude France from their informal meetings, where much of the real work of the Congress was being done.³² Talleyrand's "first plan - of swamping the Allies in a flood of minor Powers - had failed, he was still excluded from the inner councils" of the four allies.³³ France at least had some say in the procedures of the Congress and had an avenue into the allied counsels, however. Talleyrand's "zeal for the plenary session faded away "after France was formally admitted into the inner circle of powers later on in the congress; once he had kept the Quadruple Alliance from excluding France completely, "he rapidly abandoned all his small allies."³⁴ But, according to von Gentz, at the meeting on September 30, "The intervention of Talleyrand and Labrador has hopelessly upset all our plans."³⁵

Talleyrand, having made his voice heard, next set out to aggravate the latent divisions between the four former allies. Baron von Stein, a German advisor of Alexander I, wrote that Talleyrand's remarks had done nothing but "create the greatest suspicion and strengthen the determination of the allies to hold together."³⁶ But, eventually, ill feeling over the twin issues of Saxony and Poland was to divide the four powers who had defeated Napoleon. Perhaps Talleyrand's "great achievement was to exploit and increase their disunion to the point where France came to hold a balance between conflicting pairs "of the allies, so he could have some influence on decisions.³⁷ According to J. G. Lockhart "As a sower of discord, Talleyrand has never had a superior;" and the first stages of disrupting the allies were easier because of secret treaties and conflicts of interest among the

seemingly unified bloc of the allies.³⁸

The problems of Saxony and Poland sprang from the twin ambitions of Russia to establish a subservient Polish nation, and of Prussia to be restored to the size she had had in 1805, a promise made in a treaty with Russia; for this she wanted Saxony. The King of Saxony had remained allied with Napoleon for so long that Russia, Prussia, and Great Britain regarded him as dethroned, but, according to von Gentz, Austria and France held that the King of Saxony should have the power of consent to any negotiations on the fate of his country.³⁹ Talleyrand saw that there was a potential for conflict between the interests of the two aggressive powers and France, Great Britain, and Austria, who would be interested in preserving some type of balance of power and keeping Russia and Prussia from becoming too strong. By October, 1814, it had been assumed that in return for giving up to Russia her claims on her former Polish lands, Prussia would be compensated with Saxony. Neither Austria nor Great Britain were completely satisfied with this arrangement, and Talleyrand was able to give their dislike "...a consistency from which a firm negative emerged."⁴⁰ At least partially through his efforts, a united front of France, Great Britain and Austria emerged in opposition to the plans of Russia and Prussia, and compromises were made that preserved the old balance of power in Europe for some time to come.⁴¹ Talleyrand wrote to Louis XVIII that the Saxon question was reviewed when, through his "reasonable, thoughtful and consistent" language, "it was perceived that he was arguing not more in the interest of France than of Europe in general, and of each individual state."⁴² However, it was not only reason that Talleyrand used to try to change their minds, but military power, cajolery, and flattery, as well as British and Austrian fear of Russian and

Prussian expansion.

At first, Talleyrand tried to create a general feeling of trust in France, and by the end of October he had succeeded to some extent; the Archduke John of Austria wrote in his diary that "France wants tranquillity, because the present dynasty knows the danger of war; for everyone demands this state as an ally." His reaction to Talleyrand was: "What an interesting man! A worm-eaten heart, but an excellent head."⁴³ A secret police report to the Austrian emperor indicated that people were saying "Talleyrand is the only one talking sense now...for Talleyrand asks nothing for France. He wants only justice, stability, moderation, and peace..."⁴⁴ At the same time, Talleyrand set forth his arguments in favor of the King of Saxony as a legitimate king. He maintained that though Prussia deserved some reparation for the war, to despoil the king of Saxony would be to acknowledge the rule of the strongest; France would go along with any arrangements that were not against what was right.⁴⁵ He used these arguments to make the allies' arrangements seem unjust; "The papal legate, Cardinal Consalvi, relates how Talleyrand during October was carrying on a vigorous campaign of opposition in Congress and referring to their negotiations on Poland and Saxony as intrigues."⁴⁶

In his first letter to Louis from Vienna, Talleyrand wrote that he had only to carry out "the principles laid down by Your Majesty" to win the confidence of the minor powers. By Sept. 29, though, he felt that Russia and Prussia would back down if the great powers were to declare unanimously against them,⁴⁷ and felt less need of the support of lesser nations.

Lord Castlereagh, the British ambassador, was difficult for Talleyrand to approach. He favoured strengthening Prussia as a balance or counterweight to Russia, and had no compunctions about depriving the Saxon king of

his throne, whereas Talleyrand was more afraid of Prussian domination of Germany than he was of Russia and called Castlereagh's designs for making the Elbe a line of defense against Russia "un~~ne~~pure illusion," partly because of the friendship that existed between Frederick William III and Alexander.⁴⁸ Castlereagh favored some sort of alliance between Austria and Prussia, probably as an added defense against Russia, but Talleyrand felt that this alliance could be aimed at keeping the French from becoming too powerful on the seas by making it necessary for them to concentrate on their continental defenses.⁴⁹ Accordingly, he tried to make Castlereagh see^{the} ~~the~~ disadvantages of aggrandizing Prussia with Saxony and the difficulties in uniting Austria and Prussia; "I quoted him facts concerning the policy of Prussia for the last 60 years which he could not deny..."⁵⁰ Talleyrand told Castlereagh that not only was the King of Saxony a legitimate monarch who should not be deposed, but a Prussia fortified with Saxony would make the heart of Austria vulnerable; Castlereagh "seemed astonished." Talleyrand also made it clear that since it was the relative boundaries of the powers in Poland, and not Polish independence that was in question, he would support Prussian and Austrian territorial claims in Poland. Saxony, therefore, was a more important question than Poland in French eyes.⁵¹ He also warned Castlereagh that he should be concerned about the fate of the market at Leipzig.⁵² Talleyrand at one point blamed Castlereagh for the troubles the Congress was having:

"I told Lord Castlereagh that the trouble he was in was created by his own conduct and that of M. de Metternich; that it was they who had made the Emperor of Russia what he is..."

⁵³
by not supporting proposals to open the Congress.

Negotiating with Austria, Talleyrand had little trouble stirring up discontent with the proposal to give Saxony to Prussia. In the first place,

Austria acquiesced in that arrangement only because it had been previously arranged, not because of her interests.

"Elle n'avait pas meme été arrêtée alors par le danger pour elle de laisser la Prusse s'établir sur les flancs des montagnes de la Bohême, danger qu'elle sembla ne voir que lorsque la France l'en eût averti."

Talleyrand was quick to point out the danger to Austria should Prussia get so close to Bavaria, and he bypassed Metternich to encourage the Emperor Francis to conserve Saxony.⁵⁴

Metternich also was a target for Talleyrand's persuasions. In some of his notes, Talleyrand assured Metternich that France had no desire to extend her boundaries and that she only wanted justice and a true equilibrium in Europe. Poland would have been the greatest question treated at the Congress, but since Polish independence was impossible, "after having offered, which she has done, to support the most equitable pretensions, the desire that you should be satisfied... (was next)." He tried to convince Metternich that both the principles of legitimacy and equilibrium were at stake in Saxony.⁵⁵ He also played on more selfish interests. At one meeting with Metternich, Talleyrand asked "How can you possibly contemplate placing Russia like a girdle all around your principal and most important possessions?" Another approach was an appeal to Metternich in the name of the family ties of the royal houses of Saxony and Austria.⁵⁶ In the middle of November, Talleyrand took Metternich aside, and to find out where he stood on Poland and Saxony "...instead of putting questions to him on those points, which he would have avoided, I spoke to him about himself only, assuming the tone of an old friend..." and telling him that he should make known what caused his actions, for the sake of his reputation. Metternich was persuaded to show Talleyrand some of

his correspondence with the Prussians.⁵⁷

The approaches to Austria and Great Britain that Talleyrand used were varied. C. K. Webster has said that though one of Talleyrand's notes to Metternich was a lofty defense of the integrity of Saxony, in his private interviews he was much more accomodating to Austrian interests; Webster also wrote that Talleyrand's insistance on the primacy of the Saxon question over the Polish caused friction between him and Castlereagh, who had to restrain Talleyrand from bringing forward the Saxon affairs in inopportune notes.⁵⁸ Talleyrand, though, felt that popular sentiment in England was for the King of Saxony and hoped to embarrass Castlereagh by this means.⁵⁹ In his memoirs, Talleyrand credited his arguments with showing both the British and Austrians at the Congress the way they should look at the fate of Poland and Saxony according to their own interests; then the two countries were willing to listen to French arguments in favor of principles. "Lorsque ces deux puissances virent que leurs propres convenances se trouvaient d'accord avec le principe de^{la} légitimité, elles reconnurent volontiers que ce principe l'emportait sur les convenances des autres...Ainsi la France, par le seul ascendant de la raison, par la puissance des principes, venait de rompre une alliance qui n'était dirigée que contre elle."⁶⁰

Talleyrand's dealings with Alexander^{were} also based on this mixture of appeals to vanity, moral idealism and selfish interests. When Alexander proposed an exchange of Russian support of what France wanted in Naples in return for French support of his desire to rule Poland, Talleyrand responded "Vous me parlez la d'un marché...C'est votre volonté, votre intérêt qui vous déterminent, et moi, je suis obligé de suivre les principes."⁶¹ When Alexander

asserted that Austria consented to Prussian possession of Saxony, Talleyrand replied "...I find it hard to believe that she does- it would be so much against her interest. But can the consent of Austria render Prussia the proprietor of that which belongs to the King of Saxony?"⁶² He repeated to Alexander the position he had taken with Metternich and Castlereagh, that "...If the partition of the duchy of Warsaw (not a completely independent Poland) only is in question, that is much more the affair of Prussia and Austria than it is ours. Those two powers once satisfied on that point, we shall be satisfied also..."⁶³ But, the protection of a legitimate monarchy in Saxony was a matter about which all kings should be concerned. As with Metternich, Talleyrand appealed to the desire to keep up a reputation.

"...because the foremost of your interests is the care of that personal glory which you have acquired...Your Majesty must guard that glory, not for your own sake only, but also for the sake of your people..." The "principles which are the foundation of public order and security" were also at stake in

⁶⁴ Saxony. Talleyrand was careful not to offend Alexander by demanding an independent Poland and he made positive proposals for compensating Prussia without destroying ^{Saxony} Prussia. Besides that, he tried "neither to let him believe himself threatened, nor yet to leave him too much at his ease," and in the early stages of the Congress, he didn't completely rule out a Russo-French alliance, if Alexander wanted it.⁶⁵ Talleyrand had a suspicion that Alexander would secretly be glad to find a pretext for releasing himself from his promise of Saxony to Prussia, so he tried to work on that.⁶⁶

Besides reasoning, and appeals to ambition, Talleyrand's diplomacy made use of the threat of military force. On October 13, 1814, Talleyrand wrote

to Louis that "the union between the four Courts is more apparent than real," and could be broken if Louis made it known at the right time that he would support a just cause with more than ⁶⁷ reasoning. He proposed to give the Austrians the firmness of will they needed to resist Russia and Prussia by promising them French aid, and asked Louis for instructions to that effect that he could use at his discretion. "I do not like war, or wish for it, but in my opinion it would suffice to hint at it;" Talleyrand didn't believe that Prussia or Russia would risk war against Austria, France and Bavaria; he wanted to use the threat of war to prevent the sacrifice of Saxony, which he called a greater evil than war.⁶⁸ On October 25, Louis added to Talleyrand's instructions a secret authorization, to promise to the Austrians and Bavarians "la coopération militaire la plus active" from France in opposing Russian and Prussian views on Poland and Saxony; also, the French ambassadors were to inform the English cabinet of the concert of France, Austria and Bavaria in this matter if it would get their co-operation or at least their ⁶⁹ neutrality. Louis at the same time wrote to Talleyrand that he would give orders for the army to be put in the field; By the sixth of November, Talleyrand had let Austria and Bavaria know about these supplementary instructions.⁷⁰

Whether through Talleyrand's efforts or because of the natural leanings of the others at the Congress, war looked like a real possibility to some by the middle of December. "England's attitude (on Saxony) had undergone a change, and Talleyrand intended to take advantage of it as well as of the effect produced by the Austrian note, to rupture decisively the entente between the allies."⁷¹ The Austrian note referred to, was one in which Metternich favoured maintaining Saxony. Talleyrand asked that the note be officially communicated to France, believing that it would mark "the real date of the

rupture of the coalition."⁷²

According to Von Stein, a German advisor of Alexander, Castlereagh and Metternich suggested that France be included in the negotiations on Saxony and Poland as early as December 29, 1814.⁷³ Both of them were beginning to despair of overcoming the Prusso-Russian alliance and started to treat Talleyrand with more confidence.⁷⁴ Castlereagh had visited him, Talleyrand wrote on December 28, and had talked about the possibility of setting up a commission to verify the calculations of Austria and Prussia on the population of the Saxon areas to be ceded to Prussia; the two agreed that Castlereagh should propose that such a Statistical Commission be set up. Talleyrand argued that the rights of the King of Saxony should be recognized first, suggesting that Castlereagh, Metternich and he might come to an agreement about it, "an alliance if you wish." Castlereagh's plan for a Statistical Commission to settle Prussian claims was accepted by the other great powers, though there was some opposition to inclusion of a French representative on it. Talleyrand lost his temper and threatened to leave Vienna when informed of this, and won the right to have a Frenchman on the Statistical Commission.⁷⁵ The investigations of the Commission eventually showed that something less than all of Saxony would bring Prussia back to her strength of 1805; "This affords some room to vindicate the question of recognition of rights and balance of power."⁷⁶

On the third of January, a secret defensive alliance of Austria, Great Britain and France against possible aggression of Russia and Prussia was signed. Talleyrand wrote to Louis that "The coalition is dissolved...France is in concert with two of the greatest powers and three states of the second order." He attributes this change to Providence, but

"Under God, the efficient causes of this change have been -
My letters to M. de Metternich and Lord Castlereagh and the

impression which they produced; the suggestions which I gave Lord Castlereagh, relative to a union with France...; the pains I had taken to lull his distrust by exhibiting perfect disinterestedness in the name of France; the peace (of Great Britain) with America...; Lastly, the pretensions of Russia and Prussia."⁷⁷

So, France became "l'arbitre et la modératrice" of Europe. Talleyrand claimed that he had to check Metternich's tendency to concede too much, but there was after that an understanding on principles of legitimacy and equilibrium between England, Austria and France.⁷⁸ By January 9, the four former allies had agreed to include France in their deliberations and the Committee of Five became the directing body of the Congress.⁷⁹ Talleyrand went with Wellington (who replaced Castlereagh as the English plenipotentiary) and Metternich to persuade the King of Saxony to cede part of his domain, and after that cession Russia had to desist from claiming all of Poland.⁸⁰ Webster has claimed that French achievement of parity with the allies was "less due to any effort or intrigue on his (Talleyrand's) part than to the fact that the four Powers had been unable to agree and had in fact come to the verge of war."⁸¹ Perhaps, though, Talleyrand's agitations were an element in keeping them from agreeing. In the end, Saxony was preserved, although it was considerably reduced. Talleyrand wrote that he would not formally protest that settlement because "...By protesting, the principle of legitimacy...which we have preserved as if by a miracle, would have been compromised..." but he also reminded Louis that the balance of power in Germany as well as legitimacy had to be considered in the Saxon settlement.⁸²

Talleyrand wrote to Louis that the saving of the principle of legitimacy in dealing with Saxony had "...even been the the means of giving us supporters in the Naples affair," for once a legitimate king had been preserved in Saxony, that principle had to be followed in Naples, also.⁸³ In negotiations

about Italy, the French interest in restoring the Bourbon Ferdinand IV to the throne of Naples had to be balanced with the French desire to keep Austria from becoming the dominant force in northern Italy. During the Napoleonic wars, the Austrians had made an agreement to support Murat. Though the overthrow of Murat was accomplished, this was only after Murat gathered troops in an area that made Austria willing to attack him. "The finesse of Metternich, aided by the folly of Murat, eventually settled the matter without much assistance from Talleyrand, who however, received a handsome pecuniary reward from the restored Bourbons."⁸⁴ (Perhaps this is one of the bases for Lockhart's charges that Talleyrand never insisted upon principles with as much force as when he anticipated a financial reward, though there is no evidence that at the Congress he took bribes.⁸⁵) Talleyrand also worked to prevent the crown of Sardinia from going to an Austrian prince by promoting the claims of the Savoy-Carignan branch of the royal house of Savoy, and some have evaluated his motives in this matter as concern for a legitimate government along with a desire to check the house of Austria.⁸⁶ The succession in Sardinia was brought to a conclusion satisfactory to Talleyrand.

In other respects, the final settlement of Italy has been seen as a defeat for Talleyrand. He used his old tactic of emphasizing that the French were concerned with the establishment of order and stability in Europe. To Metternich, he said that Murat should be overthrown and legitimate governments set up, in order to ^{prevent} revolutionaries in Italy from organizing.⁸⁷ To Castlereagh, Talleyrand insinuated that the London government would only be satisfied if he worked with France on the question of Naples; he reported to

Louis that "...if I have not quite persuaded him to adopt a policy,...I have brought him to desire almost as ardently as we do the expulsion of Murat.⁸⁸ The British had^{made} an armistice and the Austrians a treaty with Murat. However, according to Harold Blinn, neither country was strongly disposed to fulfill their obligations to Murat even before the Congress opened.⁸⁹ Metternich was reluctant to begin any hostilities with Murat while there was a threat of war over the Poland-Saxony problems, and he stalled for time. Talleyrand, who did not want to drive the four allies back together again, said on November 5 that he would consent to treatment of the affairs of Italy in geographical order, from north to south, making Naples the last problem to be handled.⁹⁰

"Though Talleyrand objected, he could do nothing until the Polish-Saxon question enabled him to make the destruction of Murat a condition of his alliance."⁹¹ Even after the settlement of that question, when an indiscretion on Murat's part gave Austria an excuse to send troops from Poland to Italy, and there could no longer be the excuse that Murat could bring about an upheaval in Italy, Metternich asked Talleyrand to postpone pushing for the overthrow of Murat. Talleyrand consented, but he wrote to Louis that he did not understand the reason for the delay.⁹²

What Talleyrand did not know was that Metternich had written to the government in Paris to undermine Talleyrand's efforts in the settlement of Northern Italy. It had been the French plan that the three duchies of Parma, Piacenza and Guastalla, or Tuscany should be given as compensation to the Bourbon Queen of Etruria, and that only a pension and a few fiefs should be given to Napoleon's former Empress, Marie Louise. The Austrians,

though, wanted to provide for their princess and to give Marie Louise the three duchies or Lucca.⁹³ Blinn blames Talleyrand for not getting anything more binding than verbal assurances of support against Murat from Castlereagh and Metternich in return for supporting them in the Polish and Saxon questions.⁹⁴ Metternich and Castlereagh were able to compromise his position by persuading Louis and his ministers to give in to Austrian demands for Marie Louise in return for a guarantee of Austrian recognition of Ferdinand IV as king of Naples, and a pledge of action against Murat.⁹⁵ Talleyrand, awaiting instructions from Paris on Parma, wrote to Louis that while serious consequences could result, it would possibly be worthwhile to sacrifice the duchies to Metternich in return for such a pledge, but later he added he had little faith in Metternich's promises.⁹⁶ Metternich had asked for a delay in the Italian settlement to give Paris time to send Talleyrand new instructions which would oblige Talleyrand to consent to Austrian plans in northern Italy. When these came, they "deprived Talleyrand of influence," and the rest of Italy was partitioned to Metternich's liking.⁹⁷ This has been seen as a "heavy diplomatic defeat" for Talleyrand, for Austrian hegemony in northern Italy was firmly established afterwards.⁹⁸

A smaller issue treated at the Congress, one that also illustrated Talleyrand's diplomatic methods, was the abolition of the slave trade. Because of the fervent public opinion in favor of it in Great Britain, Louis had signed an article in the treaty of Paris which said that he would help the English in their efforts to have the Congress pronounce the trade in black slaves illegal.⁹⁹ Louis and Talleyrand were prepared to honor this commitment, but Talleyrand wanted to protect French self interest. He wrote in his instructions that if the maritime countries of Spain and Portugal should get a delay in the abolition of the trade, the ambassadors should make sure that France

also would have the advantage of the additional time.¹⁰⁰ French public opinion was opposed to abolition of the trade, though, because there was fear that Great Britain's interests would be served by it, since French colonial production would be reduced, but the English had a backlog of colonial goods to¹⁰¹ sell.

In spite of the scorn for diplomatic bargaining which he expressed on several occasions, Talleyrand suggested in his instructions that since both France and Great Britain could be conservative at the congress, France could hope for British support in some questions if the French satisfied the English "sur les points qu'elle a le plus à coeur," like the abolition of the slave trade.¹⁰² At one point, he hinted that an indemnity or return of one of the colonies France had lost would make Frenchmen more willing to consent to outlawing the trade, but he later had to deny the offer because French opinion "had become so inflamed."¹⁰³

Talleyrand stalled for time, telling Castlereagh that the affair of the negro slaves should be taken up after European matters. But, by December 15, he asked that a commission on the slave trade should be formed "in order to propitiate Lord Castlereagh and to induce him by that means to act with us in the difficult Italian questions which we are approaching. I did obtain something..." for Castlereagh agreed to send a courier to London for the orders he would need to help Talleyrand in the Naples negotiations.¹⁰⁴

Both Spain and Portugal agreed to give up the slave trade in eight years time. Talleyrand wrote to Louis that "We have yielded nothing, and yet the English are satisfied with us" because of his assistance in the matter; Castlereagh even thanked Talleyrand for his aid.¹⁰⁵ Talleyrand hoped to use this gratitude. "Lord Castlereagh did not hesitate to assure me that England would

willingly undertake to assign an income to Murat out of English funds..." after he was deposed, if France would give up the slave trade instead of taking the four year delay she had been promised. Talleyrand speculated that England might also take over the pension which France had been obligated to send Napoleon at Elba, which had not been paid, if France gave up the trade. He suggested that the king weigh the advantages of four years of slave trade against English help in defeating Murat.¹⁰⁶ In the end "Talleyrand gave him (Castlereagh) some support on the general principle, with a view to conciliating British public opinion, but refused immediate abolition."¹⁰⁷

In early March, 1815, when the news reached Vienna that Napoleon had escaped from Elba, Metternich called a meeting of the ministers. Talleyrand was the first to arrive. Metternich reports that "I gave him the despatch from Genoa to read. He remained calm...;" Talleyrand refused to admit that Napoleon would attack France directly.¹⁰⁸ The archduke John of Austria wrote that "Talleyrand, whom I met at court, thought the situation unimportant; yet his anxiety was apparent, for he sought a declaration by the allies."¹⁰⁹

When Napoleon's entry into France developed, the representatives of the eight countries who had signed the Treaty of Paris signed a declaration that Napoleon was an outlaw, and later the alliance of the Treaty of Chaumont was re-created, with France invited to join the alliance.¹¹⁰ Talleyrand wrote that it was due to the principles he had maintained that various declarations against the usurper Napoleon were made.¹¹¹

While this is probably overdrawn, according to von Stein, "it was decided to take Talleyrand's advice and issue a declaration which specifically set forth that the object of war was the removal of Napoleon..."¹¹² Talleyrand did influence the attitudes

of the allies.

On March 29, 1815, Talleyrand wrote that "We are redoubling our efforts to bring the affairs of the Congress to a termination..." and that the last act of the Congress should be significant.¹¹³ William von Humboldt, a Prussian minister, also noted that the return of Napoleon "will undoubtedly bring nearer the end of the Congress. Talleyrand drew this moral of acceleration from it today."¹¹⁴ Though he was pressed by Louis to leave Vienna, Talleyrand stayed until the end of May, because, he wrote, "everyone needs urging forward," and some of the other plenipotentiaries wanted him to sign the protocols of the arrangements made by the Congress. His last struggle was against those who wanted to delay the signing of the last act of the Congress; Talleyrand wanted the settlement made definite and wrote to Louis "There is nothing more essential to your Majesty's interests than for your name to be placed in an act which was to proclaim the union of all the Powers."¹¹⁵ Along with the English and Austrians, he pressed for a general act to conclude the Congress.¹¹⁶ The seven great powers signed such an act on June 9, 1815.

"Estimates of his usefulness vary, and his character, violently attacked during his lifetime, has had both its apologists and its detractors. Talleyrand appeared at the Congress of Vienna as the most accomplished of all the diplomats of the old school."¹¹⁷

He showed his skill at Vienna by accepting the fact that France was in an inferior position after her defeat and trying to turn her status into that of "justice of the peace to Europe."¹¹⁸ It would be difficult to say how much this turnabout in France's situation was due to Talleyrand alone. It would also be difficult to say whether his efforts were motivated by "the genuine desire to establish the peace of Europe upon a lasting basis," as Duff Cooper and others have claimed, or whether re-establishment of French

power and his own credit with Louis were more basic motivations.¹¹⁹ A small point that may surprise is that Talleyrand would not favour the suggestion, made in early January, that if Prussia should be given all Saxony, the King of Saxony could be re-settled in the Rhineland, "sorely tempted though the latter (Talleyrand) perhaps was to establish a weak and subservient Power on the left bank of the Rhine."¹²⁰

Whatever his motives, Talleyrand used diplomatic methods of opportunism and great flexibility at Vienna. It has been said that he "held that every policy should be founded on principle or on something that sounded like a principle."¹²¹ Certainly, he appealed to moral abstractions to persuade other diplomats at Vienna to follow his ideas. Talleyrand wrote to Louis, though, that "...the idea even of perfect political institutions and of a perfect balance of power had to be made subservient to the establishment of a lasting peace," and that "The restoration of your Majesty's government ...alone made it possible to establish the tranquillity and future prosperity of Europe upon a solid foundation."¹²² The four main objectives of French diplomacy at Vienna listed in Talleyrand's instructions were all achieved, and France had a place in the counsels of Europe, at least partly due to Talleyrand's varied approaches to the other ministers, his compromises, and his diplomatic dodging and weaving.

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FOOTNOTES

¹Guglielmo Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe, trans. by Theodore R. Jaeckel (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1941), p. 288.

²J. G. Lockhart, The Peacemakers (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934), pp. 15, 79.

³Ibid., p. 11.

⁴Duff Cooper, Talleyrand (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1932), p. 225.

⁵Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946), p. 92.

⁶Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Mémoires du Prince de Talleyrand, Vol. 2 (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1891), pp. 174-193.

⁷Ibid., pp. 199-202.

⁸Ibid., pp. 205-206.

⁹Ibid., pp. 207-208.

Cooper, Talleyrand, pp. 222-223.

¹⁰Talleyrand, Mémoires, p. 209.

¹¹Ibid., p. 216.

¹²Ibid., pp. 216, 241.

¹³Ibid., p. 233.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 237.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 238-249.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 254.

¹⁷C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna (London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1937), p. 51.

¹⁸Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 125.

¹⁹Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 53.

²⁰Talleyrand, Mémoires, p. 159.

²¹Talleyrand, The Correspondence of Prince Talleyrand and King Louis XVIII with notes by M. G. Pailain (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1881) pp. 544-545.

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²²Prince Richard Metternich, ed., Memoirs of Prince Metternich, Vol. II, trans. by Mrs. Alexander Napier (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1881), pp. 553, 559. All following references will be to Vol. II unless Vol. I is specified.

²³Lockhart, Peacemakers, p. 23.
Metternich, Memoirs, p. 284.

²⁴Frederick Freksa, ed., A Peace Congress of Intrigue, trans. by Harry Hansen (New York: The Century Co., 1919), p. 164.

²⁵Webster, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 149-154, 157.

²⁶Talleyrand, Memoires, p. 278.

²⁷Ibid., p. 278.

Crane Brinton, The Lives of Talleyrand (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1936), p. 168.

²⁸Correspondence, p. 17.
Cooper, Talleyrand, p. 229.

²⁹Talleyrand, Memoires, pp. 279-281.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 281-282.
Correspondence, pp. 16-17.

³¹Talleyrand, Memoires, p. 282.

³²Webster, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 68, 72.

³³Lockhart, Peacemakers, p. 37.

³⁴Ibid., p. 37.
Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 143.

³⁵Cooper, Talleyrand, pp. 230-231.

³⁶Freksa, A Peace Congress of Intrigue, p. 358.

³⁷Brinton, The Lives of Talleyrand, p. 171.

³⁸Lockhart, Peacemakers, p. 25.

³⁹Metternich, Memoirs, pp. 576-577.

⁴⁰Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 151-152.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 167.

⁴²Correspondence, p. 526.

⁴³Freksa, A Peace Congress of Intrigue, p. 237.

⁴⁴Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe, p. 187.

45Talleyrand, Mémoires, p. 284.

46Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe, p. 183.

47Correspondence, pp. 2,9.

48Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 156.
Talleyrand, Mémoires, p. 287.

49Correspondence, p. 71.

50Ibid., p. 104.

51Ibid., pp. 104-105

52Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 172.

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54Talleyrand, Mémoires, p. 287.

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Correspondence with Alexander I, Vol. II (London: Remington and Co., 1888) p. 286.

56Correspondence, p.37.

57Ibid., p. 131.

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59Correspondence, p. 75.

60Talleyrand, Mémoires, pp. 287-288.

61Ibid., p. 286.

62Correspondence, p. 87.

63Ibid., p. 139.

64Ibid., p. 140.

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66Ibid., p. 146.

67Ibid., p. 51.

68Ibid., p. 64.

69Talleyrand, Mémoires, p. 255.

70Correspondence, pp. 95, 111.

- 71 Ferrero, The Reconstruction of Europe, p. 267.
- 72 Correspondence, pp. 210, 211.
- 73 Freksa, A Peace Congress of Intrigue, pp. 210, 211.
- 74 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 72.
- 75 Correspondence, pp. 228-231.
- 76 Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, Vol. III, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1891), pp. 5-13.
- 77 Correspondence, pp. 242-243.
- 78 Ibid., pp. 269-270.
- 79 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 74.
- 80 Talleyrand, Mémoires, pp. 289-291.
- 81 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 74.
- 82 Correspondence, p. 306.
Ibid., p. 250.
- 83 Ibid., p. 293.
Talleyrand, Mémoires, p. 293.
- 84 Cooper, Talleyrand, p. 236.
- 85 Lockhart, Peacemakers, p. 44.
- 86 Correspondence, p. 120.
- 87 Ibid., p. 118.
- 88 Ibid., pp. 322-323.
- 89 Harold E. Blinn, "New Light on Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna," Pacific Historical Review, IV , pp. 146-147.
- 90 Correspondence, p. 118.
Blinn, "New Light," p. 149.
- 91 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 124.
- 92 Correspondence, pp. 347-362.
- 93 Blinn, "New Light," p. 144.
Correspondence, p. 318.
- 94 Blinn, "New Light," pp. 154, 155.
- 95 Ibid., pp. 157-159.

- 96⁽⁵⁾ Correspondence, pp.379-380, 389.
- 97 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 124.
- 98 Blinn, "New Light," p. 160.
- 99 Talleyrand, Mémoires, pp. 198-199.
- 100 Ibid., p. 253.
- 101 Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 212.
- 102 Talleyrand, Mémoires, p. 253.
- 103 Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 212.
- 104 Correspondence, pp.180, 211.
- 105 Ibid., pp.309-310.
- 106 Ibid., pp. 331-332.
- 107 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, p. 135.
- 108 Metternich, Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 255.
- 109 Freksa, A Peace Congress of Intrigue, p. 267.
- 110 Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 227.
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- 111 Talleyrand, Mémoires, p. 298.
- 112 Freksa, A Peace Congress of Intrigue, p. 443.
- 113 Correspondence, p. 433.
- 114 Freksa, A Peace Congress of Intrigue, p. 195.
- 115 Correspondence, pp. 499, 504, 506.
- 116 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, pp.79-80.
Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna, p. 241.
- 117 Freksa, A Peace Congress of Intrigue, p. 276.
- 118 M. de Pradt, The Congress of Vienna, (London: J. Moyes for Samuel Leigh and Messrs. Bossange and Masson, 1816) p. 91.
- 119 Cooper, Talleyrand, p. 223.
- 120 Webster, The Congress of Vienna, pp. 115-116.
Cooper, Talleyrand, p. 234.
- 121 Lockhart, Peacemakers, p. 65.
- 122 Correspondence, p. 533, 535,

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Freksa, Frederick. A Peace Congress of Intrigue. Translated by Harry Hansen. New York: The Century Co., 1919.
This is a collection of extracts from diaries and letters of various people who were at the Congress. Sp

Metternich, Prince Richard, ed. Memoirs of Prince Metternich. Vols. I, II. Translated by Mrs. Alexander Napier. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1880.
There is little detail about the Congress in this book, but Metternich's impressions of Talleyrand are of interest. He wrote of Talleyrand in 1808, "...he is, on the other hand, pre-eminently a politician... as much he may be useful or dangerous." He also commented on how much Talleyrand's cleverness impressed Napoleon.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice de. The Correspondence of Prince Talleyrand and King Louis XVIII during the Congress of Vienna. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1881.

In addition to the letters that went between Talleyrand and his king, this volume contains many notes written by M. G. Billein. Naturally, Talleyrand would have been interested in glamourizing his role at Vienna in these letters, but this is one of the best records of Talleyrand's day-to-day activities.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice de. Mémoires du Prince de Talleyrand; Vol. 12. Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1891.

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles-Maurice de. Memoirs of the Prince de Talleyrand, Vol. 3. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1891.

Talleyrand's memoirs have been called "a magnificent case of special pleading" for Talleyrand's return to power. Naturally, they contain a flattering picture of Talleyrand's actions at Vienna. However, the factual information as well as the subjective impressions in the memoirs are valuable.

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Blinn, Harold E. "New Light on Talleyrand at the Congress of Vienna," Pacific Historical Review, IV pp. 143 - 160.
This article concentrates on the Italian negotiations. Its main emphasis is on Talleyrand's failure to restrain the Austrians in their search for power in Northern Italy.

Brinton, Crane. The Lives of Talleyrand. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1936.
This biography gives Talleyrand a great deal of credit for re-establishing the French position at Vienna. He took advantage of existent forces and feelings, which Brinton sees as part of his "greatness." Talleyrand is also given credit for genuine concern for European stability, and this interpretation is interesting, although there is little detail about the Congress.

Cooper, Duff. Talleyrand. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1932.
Cooper also credits Talleyrand with the belief that he was serving the best interests of Europe as well as France at the Congress. This biography follows fairly closely Talleyrand's memoirs (although it does cite some other contemporaries), but it adds that alliance of France with Britain and Austria was a life-long policy of Talleyrand's.

Ferrero, Guglielmo. The Reconstruction of Europe: Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna 1814-1815. Translated by Theodore R. Jaeckel. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1941.
Ferrero is perhaps a little too laudatory of Talleyrand, especially when he claims that legitimacy was the basis for all Talleyrand's actions at the Congress. (He was urging that legitimacy be used as the basis for the post-World War I settlement.)

Lockhart, J. G. The Peacemakers: 1814-1815. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1934.
According to Lockhart, some of Talleyrand's victories were less complete than he pretended they were, but Talleyrand is still given credit for diplomatic skill in spite of the faults Lockhart sees in his character.

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Nicolson, Harold. The Congress of Vienna. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.

This seems a fairly complete and balanced work. Nicolson also writes that Talleyrand was sincere in desiring peace for Europe, and this book praises the alliance of France, Austria and Great Britain as a useful achievement, due in large measure to the efforts of Talleyrand.

Webster, C. K. The Congress of Vienna. London: G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1937.

Webster wrote this study first to be published by the British Foreign Office in 1919 and read by those who were going to go to the negotiations at Paris. It puts a great deal of emphasis on Castlereagh and tends to downgrade the importance of the efforts of Talleyrand at Vienna.

*your research is well done -
good sources - both primary and
secondary. The paper is different
read. In part this is due to the
complexity of the topic. But also, your
writing is ably good at times.
Overall - a good paper.*

A/A -